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BY MICHAEL
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HELLER AND ] AMES

E.

KRIER

The law of takings couples together
matters that should be treated
independently. The conventional view,
shared by courts and commentators alike,
has been that any takings case can be
resolved in one of two ways: either there is
a taking and compensation is due, or there
is no taking and no compensation is due.
These results are fine as long as one
holding or the other serves the two central
concerns of the Takings Clause efficiency and justice. But a problem arises
when the two purposes behind the law of
takings come into conflict, as they readily
might. It happens that in some takings
cases there are good reasons to require
payment by the government, but not
compensation to the aggrieved property
owners. In other cases, the opposite is true
- compensation to individuals makes
sense, but payment by the responsible
government agency does not. What is
needed, then, is a set of four possible
resolutions, instead of the conventional
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The purposes of the
Takings Clause

two; the two new resolutions become
available when we uncouple efficiency
considerations from justice considerations,
or, put another way, when we uncouple
"taking" on the one hand from
"compensation" on the other. The resulting
set of four possible resolutions helps
smooth out some of the many wrinkles for
which the law of takings is renowned.
And new wrinkles keep turning up. In
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,
118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998), the Supreme
Court considered the meaning of the
phrase "private .property" in the
Constitutions injunction "[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." The majority
and dissenting opinions in Phillips took a
range of interpretive approaches to the
issue, each seemingly sensible but none
fully faithful to the animating concerns of
the just compensation requirement. The
debate among the justices ends up
shedding httle light on the ultimate takings
quesuon m the case, which remains to be
resolved on remand. As the latest in a
string of unsatisfying takings decisions,
Phillips proves less interesting for the
answers it provides than for the questions
it provokes, at least in our minds. Despite
all their differences, the Court's nine
members implicitly agreed on one thing the possibility of a taking without
compensation. This seemingly novel notion
has moved us to think anew about the
conventional law of takings, and to
consider the virtues of an expanded
approach.
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Begin with the aims of the Takings
Clause. In a vast and otherwise contentious
literature, whether judicial opinions or
scholarly books and articles, there appears
to be virtual consensus that the purposes of
just compensation are essentially two.
Frank Michelman calls them "utility" and
"fairness" in an article that remains, more
than 30 years after its publication, the most
significant piece of academic commentary
on our subject ("Property; Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of 1ust Compensation' Law,"
80 Harvard Law Review 1165 [1967]).
He could just as well have called them
"efficiency" and 'Justice," and, in fact, he
later does. Efficiency argues for allocating
resources among alternative uses in ways
that maximize value; justice argues for
distributing the costs and benefits resulting
from particular allocations in ways that
satisfy some equitable principle of
rightness.
Efficiency; in short, is about the size of
the pie, and justice is about who should
get what piece. We prefer to think about
these two concerns in terms of deterrence
and distribution, because doing so lets us
clarify some interrelationships that might
otherwise be overlooked.
A. Deterrence -

general and specific

Richard Posner identifies one deterrence
rationale for the governments obligation to
pay compensation. 'The simplest economic
explanation for the requirement of just
compensation," he says, "is that it prevents
the government from overusing the taking
power." If the government were free to take
resources without paying for them, it
would not feel incentives, created by the
price system, to use those resources
efficiently. A likely consequence would be
the movement of some resources from
higher to lower valued uses. The aim to
avoid this tendency we shall call general
deterrence.
Specific deterrence has a related but
nonetheless different purpose: the
obligation to pay compensation can
constrain governmental inclinations to
exploit politically vulnerable groups and
individuals. James Kent, in his Commentaries
(1827; reprinted by Da Capo Press, 1971),
captured the essence of both kinds of
deterrence when he referred long ago to
the compensation requirement as a "check"
on government power.

B. Distribution -

specific and general

The distributional function of just
compensation is the one most readily
acknowledged by the courts. A familiar
statement of the idea appears in Justice
Blacks opinion in Armstrong v. United States
(364 U.S. 40 [1960]): "The Fifth
Amendments guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use
without just compensation was designed to
bar government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole." As with deterrence, it
proves useful to think about distribution in
terms of the specific and the general. What
we call specific distribution is simply the
method of compensation that courts use in
takings cases now: they determine and
distribute the amounts due in terms of
each aggrieved claimant as an individual.
General distribution, on the other hand,
is our own invention, different in method,
and to some degree in purpose, from
conventional (specific) compensation. As
we have already suggested, there are
occasions when the Takings Clause, rightly
considered, calls for payment of deterrence
damages by the government, but not for
specific distribution of compensation to
claimants as individuals. Especially when a
government regulation unduly burdens
many parties, high transaction costs may
make it infeasible to compensate each
affected person through a specific
distribution of individually tailored
payments. At the same time, fairness might
not require a specific distribution either.
But it hardly follows that the responsible
government agency should not have to pay;
because considerations of efficiency might
call for payment as a deterrent, a spur to
appropriate incentives. When the
government is required to pay deterrence
damages but not to make a specific
distribution, we call the payment a general
distribution. For example, the responsible
government bureau could be required to
pay deterrence damages into a special fund,
or even into general revenues. (For our
approach to work in practice, fiscal
boundaries must not be too porous, or else
damage payments could flow back to the
responsible government bureau and
undermine the intended deterrent effect.)

C. Interrelationships of deterrence
and distribution

Deterrence and distribution are not
always independent of one another. Take
the case of general deterrence. If
compensation of any kind is denied when
justice would insist upon it, the result
would not only be unfair but might be
inefficient as well. First of all, to relieve the
government of any obligation to pay is to
forgo an opportunity to test whether the
benefits of a government program are truly
worth its costs, an important matter when
the benefit-cost call is a close one. Second,
a program that would be efficient if
compensation were paid to burdened
parties might be inefficient if compensation
is withheld, as a consequence of the
demoralization suffered by the uncompensated losers. Demoralization has to figure
into the calculation of final costs and
benefits, and thus into the question
whether a government program enhances
or diminishes net welfare. Specific
deterrence implicates similar efficiency
concerns. If compensation were not
required, politicians would be inclined to
support government projects that benefit
the privileged at the expense of the
vulnerable. If the latter lose more than the
former gain, then this kind of singling-out
promotes inefficiency and injustice alike.
Interrelationships like these have an
important bearing on the choice between
specific and general distributions, a point

I,

compensation were not required,
politicians would be inclined to support
government projects that benefit the
privileged at the expense of the
vulnerable. If the latter lose more than
the former gain, then this kind of
singling-out promotes inefficiency and
injustice alike.
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FIGURE 1: Uncoupling Deterrence and
Distribution, Taking and Compensation

Should there be payment
by the government?

Should there be
spec.ification distribution
to claimants?

Box 1

Box 2

Ordinary
Regulation

Taking/No
Compensation

Box3

Box4

No Taking/
Compensation

Ordinary
Taking

best explained by reference to Figure 1
(above), which uncouples matters that are
conventionally bound together.
Conventional wisdom allows for a pairing
of no taking/no compensation, the ordinary
regulation that appears in Box 1, and for a
pairing of taking/compensation, the
ordinary taking that appears in Box 4. The
familiar view overlooks an additional set of
two, the pairing of taking/no compensation
that appears in Box 2 and the pairing of
no taking/compensation that appears in
Box 3.
In the Box 1 and Box 4 cases, efficiency
and justice concerns can be harmonized by
one or the other ordinary route. Box 1
refers to cases where neither efficiency nor
justice calls for payment by the
government or to any individual; Box 4 has
in mind cases where efficiency and justice
both call for the opposite.
Our new entries, Box 2 and Box 3 deal
with purposes in conflict. When we s~eak
in Box 2 of a taking without compensation,
we mean a taking with no specific
distribution, as opposed to a general one. A
general distribution that forces the
government to pay (into some special fund,
100
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for example) can advance general or
specific deterrence, even through the
amount paid is not specifically distributed
to claimants. Beyond that, it is plausible to
suppose that general distributions can be
formulated in such a way as to ease
demoralization (an efficiency concern) and
promote a sense of fairness or justice,
matters we save for further discussion in
connection with the Phillips case.
The idea behind Box 3 is more
straightforward: there are occasions when
justice calls for specific distributions to
aggrieved parties, even though there is no
taking (say because there is no reason to
suppose that deterrence is a matter of
concern). Notice that we have a source for
such payments; among other possibilities,
they could be drawn from the amounts
paid in by a government agency as general
distributions in Box 2 cases.
Our claim emerges from the foregoing.
An expanded conception of the takings
picture - a move from two alternative
resolutions to four - can help resolve
conflicts left unattended by current law.

The Phillips case
Now we want to go back to Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation, the case that
provoked this essay. For generations,
lawyers have pondered the question,
"What is private property?" The same issue
is obviously latent in every takings dispute,
yet it is seldom aired because the
"propertyness" of the asset at stake in the
litigation is usually uncontested. In Phillips
It was not.
Briefly, the story behind Phillips is this.
Before 1980, the only checking accounts
that federally insured banks could provide
paid no interest. Lawyers used the accounts
anyway for pooling and disbursing certain
funds entrusted to them by or for clients,
namely any funds too nominal in amount
or held for too short a term, to earn
'
interest net of expenses in a savings
account. (Savings accounts were usually
used for large amounts held on behalf of
individual clients.) Beginning in 1980, the
rules were changed to permit federally
insured interest-bearing checking accounts
for some kinds of deposits; lawyer trust
funds could earn interest if charitable
organizations received the interest. States
moved quickly to capitalize on the new
rules by enacting Interest on Lawyer Trust
Account (IOLTA) programs. The programs
provide that any client funds otherwise
incapable of earning interest (that is,

nominal and short-term amounts) are to be
pooled together in IOLTA accounts. The
interest thereby earned by the aggregated
funds is then distributed to nonprofit
organizations that render legal services to
the poor. Every state and the District of
Columbia has such a program, and in more
than half of them attorney participation is
mandatory.
The plaintiffs in Phillips challenged
Texas' mandatory IOLTA program on
several constitutional grounds, but the only
question that reached the Court, and the
only one that shall concern us here, was
whether the interest on IOLTA accounts is
private property for purposes of the
Takings Clause. The district court rejected
the plaintiffs' claims on summary
judgment. Because the funds deposited
into IOLTA accounts are only those
incapable of earning interest net of costs,
the judge reasoned that clients owning the
principal lost nothing; indeed, they never
really had any property in the interest in
the first place. Given that there was no
property, there could be no taking. The
same logic must have figured in the
thinking of the hundreds of state judges
who had previously considered the
constitutionality of IOLTA programs in the
course of adopting them, and it supported
decisions by federal courts of appeals in
two earlier cases.
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit nevertheless disagreed,
choosing to apply a different but no less
rigorous logic. The principal amounts
deposited into IOLTA accounts are
obviously the property of the various
clients who handed over the money. Under
Texas law, the court observed, the general
rule is that "interest follows principal";
therefore, the interest must be the clients'
property as well. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
affirmed, noting that it expressed no view
as to whether the Texas IOLTA program
worked a taking, or, if it did, whether any
compensation was due. Those were
questions to be decided on remand. Four
justices dissented.

Phillips in our model
Phillips is a member of a class of cases
concerned with government regulatory
programs that impose trivial burdens per
capita but, because a large number of
people are affected, may involve substantial
sums in the aggregate. Our general reaction
to such cases runs like this: the small
burden per individual could support a
conclusion that no specific distribution is
required on fairness grounds or to ease any
"demoralization" among risk-averse
property owners. Moreover, given the large
number of people affected, concerns about
high settlement costs suggest that if any
distribution at all is to be considered, it
should be a general distribution. If
deterrence concerns arise because of the
large aggregate sums at stake, they could be
addressed by making the responsible
government bureau pay, as a general
deterrent; the obligation to pay may also be
a welcome specific deterrent in instances
giving rise to suspicions that politically
vulnerable groups are being exploited.
But Phillips calls for more particular
analysis, in part because it involves a
situation where the government program
itself creates value by pooling property
fragments, and in part because the value
created arguably comes at no expense to
property owners, meaning, among other
things, that there is no case for general
deterrence.
Pooling programs are common, but
their analysis has been neglected, especially
in connection with takings. In this regard,
notice that both specific and general
distribution seem to be impossible in
IOLTA cases, because there is nothing to
distribute. The claimants suffered no loss
by the conventional measure, and using an
alternative measure - one that made the
government pay back the interest earned
by the pooled accounts - would amount
to wiping out IOLTA programs altogether.
Phillips, then, is a pooling case, but of an
unusual sort, and unusual cases might call
for measures that rely on some mechanism
other than payments of money by and to
the parties in the lawsuit.
In deciding whether IOLTA interest was
property, the majority in Phillips focused on
the gross interest corresponding to a single
clients principal. In contrast, the dissenters
argued that if any interest-related number
were relevant, it would be the net interest
available for distribution in the unpooled
case, by definition a negative amount.

Neither approach addresses the novel
takings issues that pooling raises; the most
salient numbers are those more or less
ignored in Phillips.
One of these is the net interest that a
marginal client could deny to a mandatory
IOLTA program if the client were allowed
an "opt-out" option, say by directing that
her principal not go into her lawyers
IOLTA account. Justice Breyer probably
had this in mind when he said that the
"most that Texas law here could have taken
from the client is . . . th~ client's right to
keep the clients principal sterile, a right to
prevent the principal from being put to
productive use by others." Notice, though,
that Justice Breyers observation is not quite
correct. A marginal client's choice to opt
out of an IOLTA would not render the
client's principal "sterile"; the money would
remain productive, but the resulting
interest would be enjoyed by depository
banks. Essentially, IOLTA programs
redistribute wealth from organizations that
provide banking services for depositors to
organizations that provide legal services for
the poor.
The other salient number ignored by
the majority in Phillips is the cumulative
net interest that IOLTA programs earn from
pooling, a sum by definition not capable of
specific distribution (because such a
distribution would make IOLTA pointless).
While the majority deferred discussing it,
Justices Souter and Breyer happily noted
that conventional just compensation
doctrine would assign this new value to the
government because it was generated by
the government program at issue. Our
approach opens up new possibilities for
distributing the cumulative gains from
pooling in ways that would better serve the
purposes of the Takings Clause. For
example, certain forms of general
distribution could give clients just what
mandatory IOLTA programs take away: the
right to determine the uses to which the
earnings from principal are put, or what we
call "client-voice." Whereas conventional
takings law focuses on unpooled gross and
net interest, an approach based on
deterrence and distribution rightly shifts
attention to opt-out and client-voice
alternatives.

LAW Q UADRANGLE NOTES SPRING

2000 101

Deterrence
and distribution
in Phillips
A better approach to Phillips is to
identify the deterrence and distribution
issues at stake and to uncouple them in a
way that makes matters more tractable. In
this respect, however, the case is far from
transparent to us. The path taken by all the
justices resulted in, among other things, a
conventional factual record that is
inadequate for our unconventional
purposes. On the deterrence side, we need
to know if IOLTA programs are likely to be
so inefficient or oppressive as to require
some sort of check on the government;
with respect to distribution, we need more
nuanced information about the plaintiffs'
fairness claims and options for redressing
them. In the absence of a more developed
record, we can only offer some initial
speculations.
Pooling programs can raise questions
about inefficiency and general deterrence,
but the particular kind of pooling involved
in IOLTA programs seems untroubling. All
IOLTA programs generate value, yet even
the mandatory ones inflict no actual
monetary harm on any individual. The
degree of harm is clear, and clearly trivial,
per capita and in the aggregate, making
general deterrence a nonissue. So, too, for
specific deterrence. Clients who deposit
money in lawyers' trust fund accounts do
not strike us as politically vulnerable.
Though IOLTA programs may not be the
least costly way to fund legal services for
the poor, they are not egregiously
inefficient and do not seem likely to have
costly collateral consequences; for example,
clients are unlikely to respond by
underusing the legal system.
Fairness concerns are more troubling in
Phillips, partly because conventional just
compensation doctrine responds so poorly
to the expressive and liberty interests at
stake in the case. In IOLTA programs,
monetary losses are not the crux. Denial of
client-voice is. In this light, the majority's
position in the case seems more than a
little odd. The Chief Justice's opinion
separated interest from the principal to
which it owed. The interest was a real
thing that might quite literally have been
taken (the takings issue, recall, was
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remanded); IOLIA's redistribution of the
productive capacity of the principal, on the
other hand, was regarded as "at most" a
regulation of the "use of the property," the
plain implication being that it would pass
constitutional muster. Yet the interest so
captivating to the majority is worth
absolutely nothing, zero, to a client
depositing principal. At the same time, the
denial of aggrieved IOLIA conscripts'
ability to control the way in which their
principal is used seems to have concerned
the Court not at all. In short, the majority
focused on a trivial injury, but ignored a
substantial insult.
If considerations of justice were thought
to require it, a court (assuming it has the
authority) could instruct the responsible
government agency to make a general
distribution that gives clients a voice in the
use of !OLIA funds (say, by voting whether
to support legal services for the richer
instead of the poorer), or could allow
clients or their lawyers to opt out of (or not
opt into) the program. But !OLIA
programs do not seem to be a more
oppressive means of raising funds than a
straight tax on clients or other consumers
of legal services would be, so such a move
strikes us as unnecessary: We see the
arguments for calling Phillips a Box 2 case,
but we conclude, tentatively, that it ends
up fitting best in Box 1. Mandatory !OLIA
programs should probably be viewed as
ordinary regulations.

Demolishing and
rebuilding the
Takings Clause
Presumably, more than a few of our
readers will accuse us of demolishing the
Takings Clause and building something
else in its place. We (and many accessories
before the fact) are guilty of the second
charge, but not the first. The Supreme
Court started the process of demolition
75 years ago. Before then, takings law was
pretty simple and solid, if not particularly
satisfying. When the government took title
to property or actually occupied it, then
just compensation was due; otherwise it
was not. Matters started to get complicated
in 1922, when the Court decided
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
191. Suddenly, even the burdens worked
by regulatory measures might amount to
takings, unless the measures were intended
to control nuisances.

Developments since have only added to
the muddle, but we shall refrain from a
blow-by-blow description because even an
abbreviated account would bore
aficionados, and only a lengthy one would
satisfy anybody else. Let an inventory
suffice: Supreme Court decisions over the
last three-quarters of a century have
obscured and bifurcated the nuisance
exception to regulatory takings; have
waffled on the question of conceptual
severance; have distinguished
inconsistently between permanent and
temporary takings; have suggested that
what is not just compensation actually is
just compensation, if only regulators are
crafty; have made little of large losses,
unless they are entire, and much of small
ones, even when they are zero; have
become confused about what
"private property" is for
purposes of the Takings
Clause; have, in short,
turned the words of the
Takings Clause into a
move prompted Justice
cryptogram that only the
Kennedy to caution that the Court must
justices in a given case are
be "careful not to lose sight of the
able to decipher (and seldom
importance of identifying the property
do all of them agree).
allegedly taken, lest all govemmental
So demolition has been
action be subjected to examination
the Courts doing, and the
under the constitutional prohibition
mess is hardly surprising:
against taking without just
changing times, values,
compensation, with the attendant
politics, and personalities
potential for money damages."
result in new and different
views among the members of
the Court, yet our constitutional tradition
requires that the justices always moor their
opinions to particular words. The tie has
held, but only because the words have
been stretched beyond recognition. To
make sense of the Takings Clause, it is time
to look behind its text to its purposes, and
go anew from there. One such purpose is
obviously fairness, but another is
necessarily efficiency, thanks to
Pennsylvania Coal. Whatever the Court's
decision in that case left obscure, it made
clear that regulations are often a substitute
for eminent domain. There is abundant
agreement that the power of eminent
domain is justified and constrained for
reasons that have to do, in part, with
efficient use of society'.s resources. It would
be strange to suppose that the same is not
true of regulatory substitutes.
A problem with this observation is that
it calls up the ghost of substantive due

T..
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process. If the courts are to review
regulatory measures with efficiency in
mind and the means for deterrence in
hand, then arguably this is little different
from empowering them to second-guess
the legislature generally But the Court does
that now, at least in the context of takings.
In its first exaction case, Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825,841
(1987), the majority established a practice
of reviewing land-use regulations with
unusually close attention to the connection
between ends and means. Then, in its
subsequent decision in Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,391 (1994), the
Court insisted upon rough proportionality
between the thing exacted and the
development permitted in exchange.
Dissenting in the latter case, Justice Stevens
remarked on the majoritys "application of
what is essentially the doctrine of
substantive due process."
Seemingly, the Fifth Amendments
limitation to measures taking "private
property" would constrain the judiciarys
freedom to strike down regulatory
programs, but that constraint has just
recently been loosened considerably In its
decision in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118
S. Ct. 2131 (1998), the Court considered
the constitutionality of legislation holding
certain employers retroactively liable for
employee retirement benefits. The plurality
invalidated the measure as a taking, even
though it concerned no standard property
interest. The move prompted Justice
. Kennedy to caution that the Court must be
"careful not to lose sight of the importance
of identifying the property allegedly taken,
lest all governmental action be subjected to
examination under the constitutional
prohibition against taking without just
compensation, with the attendant potential
for money damages."
The question of appropriate limitations
on the scope of judicial review is not our
problem. Whatever the boundaries of the
Takings Clause, we think there is much to
be gained by analyzing takings in terms of
the clauses underlying purposes, and by
understanding that efficiency and justice
are best served by uncoupling matters and
methods of deterrence from matters and
methods of distribution. Thus might we
develop a body of law as supple as the
challenges it confronts.
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